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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN STATES REFINING 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-· vs.-
J3LAIR BERRY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 8602 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As stated by Appellant, this action was commenced 
on June 7, 1956, by the service upon the Defendant of a 
"ten day" Summons. Thereafter, the Complaint was filed 
in the District Court of Davis County in which it is al-
leged that Defendant had breached a certain contract 
theretofore entered into between him and the Plain-
tiff in that he failed to purchase all of the petroleum prod-
ucts required by him from the Plaintiff; that he trans-
ferred fron1 the serviee station owned by the Plaintiff 
various customers and accounts to another station owned 
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by the Defendant. It also alleged that Defendant had 
assigned certain credit card charges to Plaintiff with 
recourse and that the same had not been paid so that the 
out.standing balance in the sum of $2,592.15 was owing 
by Defendant to Plaintiff. Plaintiff further sought to 
recover rent owing upon the service station leased by it 
to the Defendant (R. 2, 3, 4). 
Instead of answering the Complaint, Defendant filed 
a motion to quash the service of Summons upon the 
ground that "the Plaintiff, through its agents, obtained 
the service of said Summons on the Defendant by inveig-
ling or enticing the Defendant into the jurisdiction of the 
above-entitled Court by deceit, artifice or trick." (R. 7). 
Thereafter, at the time of the hearing of said motion, 
the Defendant added an additional ground for quashing 
the service of Summons "for the reason that the Defend-
ant was, at the time of the service of said Summons, iin-
mune fron1 the service of process by the Plaintiff in rela-
tion to the subject of this action." (R. 9). 
I~etween the time of filing the motion to quash and 
the hearing thereof by the Court, Defendant had taken 
th(\ deposition of three n1en1bers of the organization of 
tlv~ Plaintiff Co1npnny: \)T. F. -\Vagstaff, President 
:-.~ eal R. Olson, General S.a1es l\fanager, and Richard G-. 
}~oren, an e1nployce of the Sales Department~ "Tho at 
th(\ tin1e \vns also acting as attorney for the Co1npany. 
Defendant also took t1H~ deposition of R.oyal .. A_. Reynolds, 
1fnrshall of North Salt Lake, \Yho had served the Surn-
lnons upon the Defendant. Apparently after taking the 
l'oregoin~ depositions, Defendant realized that the clni1n 
of "invei~ling or <'ntiring the Defendant into the Stat0 
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of Utah by deceit, artifice or trick" was not well.founaea 
thereby necessitating the general claim that Defendant 
was immune from service at the time that process was 
in fact served upon hirn. Although the first ·ground of 
the motion \VaS not entirely .abandoned at the time "of the 
hearing, Defendant has now apparently \Vaived it by 
conceding in his Brief that the trial court resolved the 
issues of fact against De fen d.ant, by its determination 
that the service of process was good. 
Although AppellHnt has set forth with clarity most 
of the facts in respect to the rnatteT now before the 
Court, some conflicts in the evidence exist that should 
l;8 pointed out. The Defendant, ]\{(r .. Berry, testified that 
rJl he \Vas advised by ~,{r. Boren was that "he wanted me 
to come to Salt Lake to go over my accounts, which they 
figured was delinquent, and a fevv other matters that 
they 'vanted to t~alk over while I w.as there." (R. 14, 15). 
Mr. Berry further testified that he told Mr. Boren that 
he vvrould be down on the 6th or the 7th o~ June (R. 16). 
On the other hand, l\ir. Boren testified that he talked to 
::·:Ir. Ber:ry and asked hirn \vhen he would be able to come 
uo\vn? and n1r. Berry said ''1le \Vas very busy, and he 
didn't l~now wheth::-~r or not he ~would be able to co1nu 
do\vn and talk to then1 ;" (R. 63) "that he didn't know 
\Yhether he would corne down, but it 1night be the first 
of the fol1o"'.ving week," (R. ()~-). Mr. Berry refused to 
state when he \Vould COlile down. Mr. Boren rGplif'~~, 
··~.Fell t 11e11, if you like make it .at your O"\vn convenienc.". 
\V 0, "\'11~1 rnect \Vith you on s~atnrJay or Sunday or a~1Y­
r~~f' yo-:1 s~_y." Thereupon J\llr. Berry said '"I cnn't tell 
.\-on (ief~nit~l~~. Probabl7 Thursday or Friday." .1.\ncl 
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that was the way it was left. As a matter of fact Mr. 
Bore·n stated he was surprised when he came into the 
office the morning after his return from Idaho and Mr. 
Berry arrived (R. 65). 
One of the first things that happened after the con-
ference began rut the offices of Plaintiff Company was 
that Mr. Wagstaff, President of the Company, came in 
and stated, "As far as I am concerned, why I would sue 
you. I wouldn't monkey wi,th you. But if you can make 
some sort of agreement with these boys - meaning 
Neal ~and Dick - why that is fine with me. But as far 
as I a1n concerned, I have 'va.sted all the time coaxing you 
that I a1n going to and trying to meet your demands." 
With that Mr. Wagstaff left the room (R. 42). Later on, 
Mr. Wagstaff directed Mr. Boren to prepare a Summons 
in order that a suit might be instituted before ~Ir. Berry 
] eft if no agreement 'vas reached ( R. 43). 1\fr. Berry first 
admitted that Mr. \Vagstaff had stated that he \vould 
just as soon sue him as not, but then later stated that he 
had no recollection thereof (R. 27, 28). 
Both Mr. Boren and I\Ir. Olsen testified that an 
an·rcen1ent w·a3 tentatively reached "ith ~Ir. Berrv and (' . . 
that he left the roon1 and \vent out and discussed the 
\natter \vith his \vife. "\\~hen he returned he then made 
son1e changes .and denulnds \Yhich could not be met by 
the Plaintiff, " 7hereupon l\Ir. Olson indicated that if 
nothing was worked out they \Yonld have to sue 1\rfr. 
Berry. J\ifr. Berry then replied, ""\'7 ell, you go ahead and 
sue 1ne, if you want. I don't care. You do \vhatever you 
please." (R. 53, 61, 62). It \vas at that point that the 
1\f ar~hall ,v.as railed in to serve the Sumn1ons (R. 61). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The only point raised on appeal is whether the De-
fendant was immune from service of Summons at the 
time the Summons \Vas served upon him. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT vV AS NOT IMMUNE FROM SERVICE OF 
SUMMONS. 
Irt must be pointed out that the issue presented to 
this Court is one of law, ina.s1nuch as the trial court found 
the factual issues against the Defendant .and in favor 
of the Plaintiff. In determining \vhether the trial court 
properly overruled Appellant's motion all intendments 
are in favor of the ruling and the burden is upon Appel-
lant to satisfy this court th.at as a matter of lavv the lower 
court was in error. Franklin v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. 
A pp. 2d 292, 220 P. 2d 8. 
Defendant's contention is that he came into the State 
of Utah at the invitation of the Plaintiff "for the sole 
purpose of conferring with the Plaintiff in regard to the 
settlen1ent of a theD existing controversy" and for that 
reason was immune frorn servi~e during the time he vvas 
here. In support of this contention, Appellant relies upon 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Montana in the case 
of State ex rel Ellan v. District Court of Eighth Judicial 
JJistrict, 97 ~~font. 229, 33 P. 2d 526, 93 A.L.R. 865. !Io\v-
ever, the decision of lvfontana Supreme Court stands 
olon(~ a.nd is not supported by reason or by authority in 
any other jurjsdiction. 
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The general rule is that if personal service of process 
is procurre~d by fraud, trickery, or- artifice, it will not 
be sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the person 
thus served. This rule applies irrespective of whether 
the Defendant is a resident or non-resident of the state 
or county where the service of process is made, although 
it is usually found to apply in instances where a non-
resident of rthe state is served with process while in an-
other state. A general discussion of the matter is con-
tained in 42 Am. Jur., "PROCESS" Sec. 35, p. 32, where 
th~ rule is stated thusly: 
"Thus, if a person resident outside the juris-
diction of the court and the reach of its process 
is inveigled, enticed, or induced, by any false rep-
resentation, deceitful contrivance, or wrongful 
device for 'vhich the Plaintiff is responsible, to 
come 'vithin the jurisdiction of the court for the 
purpose of obtaining service of process on him 
in an action brought against hin1 in such court, 
process sel\'"ed upon hin1 through such improner 
means is invalid, and upon proof of such fact 
the court 'vill, on motion, set it aside. This princi-
ple has been applied generally to the Defendant's 
property as well as to his person. The rule applie~ 
also where the presence of the Defendant within 
the jurisdirtj on of the court has been procured by 
force, or by abuse of criminal process. Thus, al-
though the authorities are not harn1onious in re-
spect of the right of a nonresident Defendant in a 
criminal case to iln1nunity fro1n the service of civil 
process, there seen1s to be no dissent from the 
proposition that rightful jurisdiction cannot be 
acquired by the iinproper use of the criminal 
process of a state; .and consequently, where the 
attendance has been procured by an arre.st caused 
for thP sole purpose of securing jurisdiction so 
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that the Defendant may be served with civil 
process, the courts will set aside the service. How-
eve.r, the n1ere fact that the person causing the 
Defendant to be brought into the jurisdiction for 
the trial of a criminal offen.se is .also the person 
at whose instance the civil action is instituted 
does not itself sho'v bad faith in procuring the re-
turn of the accused. And no bad faith can be 
predicated upon the fact that the criminal prose-
cution was instituted by the Plaintiff in the civil 
action when it .appears that the Defendant had 
been a resident of the state for some two weeks 
prior to the in.stitution of the criminal proceed-
ing, and so could have been served 'vith civil 
process without e1nploying the aid of any cri1ninal 
prosecution." 
In de~tern1inin.7 \vhut evidence is sufficient to shovv 
fraud and fraudulent ]ntent or purpose An1. Jur. fur-
t~:cr states: (Ibid. Sec. 36, p. 33) 
"Fraud and fraudulent intent and purpose 
in enticing .a person to come \vithin the reach of 
the process of a court m~ay be inferred from the 
acts and repre.sentations of the p·arties ·and all 
the facts and circumstances sho,vn. But, as be-
t,veen honest and dishonest n1otives and purposes~ 
honesty of intent an~1 purpose v1ill be pre:3~1::.l12:·l 
unless the facts and circninstan(l(':ls .are such as to 
satisfy the mind that the acts and statements re-
lied on are fra1Hlnlent or dj sl1onc\r< ·~. The scr·'.Ti r0 
of a writ, other\vise lawful, does not be"oine nn-
la\vful because the hope for a chance to n1ake 
it was the sole motive for other .acts tending to 
create the chance, whieh other acts \vould thern-
r,elve.s have been lawful except for that hope. 
~,Tor is fraud predieable of conduct by n10ans of' 
\Yhieh th0, Plaintiff has merely taken ndvant~gr 
of th0 n:\nn1 conrse of hnsjness.'' 
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In the case of Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144, 25 Sup. 
Ct. 614, 49 L. Ed. 988, the problem of what constitutes 
fraud or trickery was directly before the court. There 
the Plaintiff in error (Jaster) had originally filed an 
action in Nebraska against the Defendant. In connection 
with such action a notice of a taking of a deposition in 
Ohio was given to the Defendant through his attorney. 
The Defendant went to Ohio for the purpose of attending 
aJt the time the deposition 'vas taken, whereupon he was 
served with a Summons in a similar action brought 
against him in Ohio. l-Ie appeared specially in the Ohio 
action and moved to set aside the service but his motion 
\Vas denied. This decision of the trial court was affirm-
ed in 66 Ohio State 661, 65 N.E. 1127. Thereafter, judg-
ment was taken against him and subsequently an action 
on the Ohio judgment \vas fjled in ~~ ebraska. }~gain the 
Defendant appeared ana clai1ned that the judgment in 
Ohio had been taken against hlin by reason of fraud 
perpetrated upon hiln in the original service of summons. 
Th<> Supren1e Court of Nebraska a.ffirn1ed the decision 
of the trial court to the effect that there was fraud and 
dismissed~ the action, \Yhereupon the Plaintiff appealed 
to the Supre111e Court of the lT nited States. In posing 
the question to be decided by it, the Supren1e Court 
stated: 
"If the inducement to enter the Sta.te of Ohio 
furnished by· the notice to take a deposition there 
was 1nade fraudulent bv the n1otiYes bY \vhich t]u~ 
notice v;as given, then there \Vas fraud·: other"iS('~ 
there was not. On the face of the answer fraud 
is silnply the pleader's conclusion fron1 the sneci-
fic facts. The question is "~hether the 1notiv~ a1-
h\.!.;0rl ran have the effect supposed." 
10 
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In determining that the service of process 'vas not 
obtained by fraud (and reversing the decision of the 
Nebraska Suprerne Court), the Supreme Court of the 
lTnited States stated: 
"It will be observed that there vvas no mis-
representation, express or implied, with regard 
to anything, even the n1otives of the Plaintiff. The 
paDties were at arm's length. The Plaintiff did 
not say or in1ply that he had one motive rather 
than another. He sin1ply did a lav1ful act by all 
the po,vers enabling him to do it, and that was all. 
Therefore the \vord 'fr.aud' 1nay be discarded as 
inappropriate. The question is whether the serv-
ice of a writ, otherwise lawful, becomes unlawful 
because the hope for a chance to make it was the 
sole motive for other acts tending to create the 
chance, which other acts would themselves have 
been lawful but for that hope. We assume that 
motives may make a difference in liability. But 
the usual cases where they have been held to do 
so have been cases where the i1nmediate and ex--
pected effect of the act done was to inflict da1nage, 
and where therefore, as a matter of substantive 
law, if not of pleading, the act w.as thought to 
need a justification (see Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 
U.S. 194, 204, ante, 154, 159, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3), 
or else where the intent was to do a further and 
unlawful act to which the act done wa.s the means. 
Swift v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396, ante, 
518, 524, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276. 
"It is hard to exhaust the possibilities of a 
general proposition. Therefore it m.ay be dan-
gerous to say that doing an act lawful in itself as 
a means of doing another act lawful in itself 
cannot mhke a wrong by the combination. It is 
enough to say that it does not usually ha"'l:'r tl~at 
result, and that the case at bar is not an rxcrp-
11 
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tion to the general rule. We must take the allega-
tions of the answer to be true, although they are 
manifestly absurd. The Plaintiff could not have 
known that the Defendant's lawyer would advise 
him to go to Ohio, and that the Defendant would 
go to his father's house, instead of to N ebra.ska, 
when his business was over. But we assume, as 
far as possible, that the anticipation of these 
things was the sole inducement for giving the 
notice and taking the deposition. Still the notice 
was true, and the taking of the deposition needed 
no justification. It could be taken arbitrarily, be-
cause the Plaintiff chose. On the other hand, the 
Defendant could be served with process if he sa-\v 
fit to linger in Ohio. That also the Plaintiff could 
do arbitrarily, because he chose, if he thought he 
had a case. He arbitrarily could unite the t,,~o 
acts, and do the first because he hoped it would 
give him a chance to do the last." 
The theory of the court in the Ellan case, supra, 
appears to be that since by long precedent the courts 
have granted i1nmunity to non-r0sident individuals ap-
pcarinf!, in a state to attend at the trial or other judicial 
proc0edings jn sn~h state, that such in1n1unity should 
extend to all 111a tters relr..ting to problen1s of difference 
h:ot\v~\~n part-ie!~ Y.~hich 1night h(\ settled outside of the 
ronrt. ~rhe fallr~rY of such reasoning is readilv observe<l 
• L • 
"·~1rn th~ h:1~is for tlH~ rule is considered. In the court,~ 
npjninn npp0:1r~ th0 i\)llO\Ying rtnotntion fron1 FederrJ 
.Tnd~~·p ,~nn 1~,l<:'0t in P1r case of Filer v. }lrCorJnick (DC) 
~:.:~~) I11 • non~ ~l+: 
''Originally it "Tas ass0rted solely as the privi-
1 p_g·p of the court for the protection of its o'Yn 
jurisdiction, but later as thn:t of the person ron-
~Prned aR \\Tell. Baron's Abr. tit. 'Privilege.' What 
12 
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the precise limits of the right were in its earlier 
history, or those to whom extended, it is not very 
material to here inquire. * * * While it is quite 
true that the right has most frequently arisen and 
been applied in connection with parties and wit-
nesses in judicial proceedings, its extension in the 
process of time to those engaged in other depart-
ments of the public service has been more largely 
by analogous application by the courts than as a 
result of legislation." 
If, .as stated above, the rule originally can1e into 
existence to :protect the eourt in its O\vn jurisdiction, ho-w 
can it be said that any social policy is served by allo,ving 
L person to be irnrnune from process on the pretext that 
he has come into the state to engage in a discussion re-
garding differences which have not even been brought 
to the attention of the court~ There is far more reason 
to restrict the rule to the situation where the sole pur-
pose of coming into the state is to attend .a trial or other 
hearing as a witness, than to extend the immunity from 
service of process to a situation vvhere no action has even 
been filed. In the case of Franklin v. Superior Court in 
and for San Francisco Cotttnty, supra, the court held that 
the privilege of exemption from service of process for 
persons coming into the jurisdiction for the purpose of 
attending court did not extend to persons voluntarily com-
ing within the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose 
of consulting with the attorney or investig.a ting the trans-
action or otherwise .attendi_ng to matters which may be 
subject to litigation or which may eventually re·ach a 
trial. 
In Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 16 P. 2d 741, 85 
A.L.R. 1335, the Supreme Court of California refused to 
13 
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exempt from s-ervice of process a non-resident reserve 
officer of the United States Army temporarily within 
the state for the purpose of training as a reserve officer. 
The Defendant in that case was admittedly a resident of 
the State of Utah, and while on active duty with the 57th 
Coast Artillery was served with a Summons and Order 
to Show Cause in an action by a minor child to compel 
the Defendant, his father, to contribute to the minor's 
support. The Defendant relied up·on the language of 
Judge Van Fleet in the Filer case, supra, and urged that 
on the basis of public policy he should be immune from 
service of process while on active duty with the lTnited 
States Army. The Supreme Court of California enunci-
ated the following general proposition with respect to 
the privilege: 
"This exemption from service of process is, 
of course, in derogation of the right which every 
creditor has to collect his debt by subjecting his 
debtor to suit in an-v- iurisdiction where he mav 
.. •J "' 
find him. Since this is so, the privilege should 
not be extended bevond the reason of the rule 
upon which it is fou~ded. Fitzhugh v. Reid (D. C.) 
252 F. 234." 
The Supren1e Court of California "~ent on to point 
out thart in the Filer ca.se. supra, the Defendant was 
granted immunity fron1 serY"ice as a 1natter of public 
policy because '"he had con1e to this state to perfor1n 'l 
public rlut~r during a ti1ne of national e1nergency." (Ibid .. 
p. 743) 
ThP problen1 of in11nnnity from service of process 
\vhile n.ttPnding a h0nring in a foreign state as W'"ell as 
1mntunit~v fro111 proe<)ss 'rh0r0 attendance in the par-
14 
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ticular state vvas obtained by fraud is thoroughly dis-
cussed in the case of Lingo v. Reichenbach Land Com-
pany, 225 Iow.a 112, 279 l~.W. 121. There the original 
process was served upon an officer of the Reichenbach 
Land Company, a corporation, while he was in the s~tate 
of Io,va where he had gone for the purpose of attempting 
to settle and co:rnprornise an action in ejectment which 
had previously been com1nenced by the corporation 
against son1e individuals in Iowa. The same attorneys 
'.vho represented the defendants in the first action in 
connection vvith which 1vfr. Reichenbach had gone to Iovva, 
'.verc also attorneys for the plaintiff who co1nmenced 
th0 action against the Reichenbach Company. As soon 
as Mr. Reichenbach had left the attorney's office (and 
before he left the building) .after failing to settle the 
ejectment action, the attorneys had service of process 
served upon him. The record showed without dispute 
that the sole and only purpose of the defendant Reichen-
back in going to Iowa, was to secure settlement of the 
aetion pending in Fremont County, Iowa. 
The trial court sustained the special appearance of 
the defendant and plaintiff .appealed. In reversing the 
decision, the Supreme Court discussed the matter as 
follows: 
"It is the general and well-recognized rule of 
law in this and other states that witnesses and 
suitors in attendance on a court outside of the 
territorial jurisdiction of their residence are im-
mune from service of civil p-rocess while attend-
ing court, and for a re.asonable time before and 
after attending said court. (citing numerous 
cases) 
15 
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"Appellees contend, however, that the rule 
granting immunity also extends to cases where a 
nonresident is p·resent in the state in which the 
action is pending for the good-faith purpose of 
attempting a compromis·e or settlement thereof. 
The immediate question in this ease therefore is 
whether or not Appellee is entitled to immunity 
from service of the original notice in the case at 
bar while he was in this state for the purpose of 
attempting to settle an action pending in an ad-
joining county. 
"We have been cited no cases in this or any 
other state in which the rule of immunity from 
process had been extended to a case in which the 
nonresident is present in this state solely and 
only for the purpose of effecting a settlement of 
a case pending here. While this precise question 
has not been determined in this state, appellee 
contends that the same rule of justice granting 
immunity· to parties and witnesses attending a 
trial also .applies where the party is present in 
this .state for the purpose of talking settlement 
of an action pending here. 
"A nu1nber of cases hold that where a non-
resident enters a state at the request of his ad-
versary for the purpose of effecting a compro-
mise or settlen1ent of the caRP, and a notice of 
another .action is sPrYed upon hhn 'Yhile in the 
foreign state~ i1n1~1nnit:- fron1 serYice "-ill be al-
lo"'"ed the nonresident "~here the evidence tends to 
~l1 o'v that he 'vas induced to enter another state 
throu,g-h fraud Or had faith. ( (~ites S0Yerrrl eases. 
including the J\f ont~na ease of Bllan Y. District 
Court 97 1\Tont. lnO. :i;i P.:~d 526~ (1 ~3-t-l) 
"An e.'1'fl.Jnin.a.tt~on of thesr cases hnldinn that 
n nnurrsidr?lf is rntit1P.d to innnnnif?l frn;J·~ sPr-
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vice in the state of his adversary, will disclose 
that the holding was based upon bad faith or 
fraud of the adversary in inducing or enticing the 
nonresident to enter the foreign state. These 
cases announce the rule th.at the question of im-
munity from service of a process where the non-
resident enter.s another state for the purpose of 
settling or co1nprornising the action usually turns 
upon the question as to whether or not such non-
resident was fraudulently or in bad faith in-
duced to come into the other state. 
"It see1ns to be the general rule, however, 
that where no fraud or bad faith has been prac-
ticed upon the nonresident by his adversary in 
a foreign state for the purpose of indttcing or e1·'t-
ticing him to enter that state, irn1n1J;nity jrro1n 
service of notice tuill not be allowed, and 
service of notice upon a nonresident under such 
circ~trnstances will not be set aside. 1\1ia:rn.i Po\v-
der Co. v. Griswold, 5 Ohio Dec. Reprjnt, 532, G 
A1n. L. Rec. 464; Cavanagh v. Jy.lanhattan Tran-
sit Co., CC, 133 F. 818; Allen v. Whal"ton, 59 I-Iu:n. 
622, 13 NYS 38; Olean St. Raihvay Co., vs. Fair-
n1ount Construction Co., 55 .i\.pp. Di-'7. 292~ 67 lr)!~~ 
165 · -Emn.:ro llf.r.O' ( 10 -rrc G1'ncbn"~''D' ·)I)') I.,t1 A~1"" ' 1.. 1 .\.., _..,LJ.f.,• ..) • "0. :T - 0 , ........ ;:_), ._,fJ•~l .... t. I)'}J· 
2~-12; Baker v. \:Vales, 35 1\Y Su;Y~r. Ct. 403, 3 
Jones & S. 403; \¥atkins v. North .i\Jnerjcan Land 
B'J Tin1her Co., 20 Times J-1. R. (Eng.) 5B4:, IT. Ij. ~' 
(Italics added.) 
tri. ':\ /(') , ""t .(.'~ ll d ). ~ -~ . 
l_ lL'.- I_,OuJ. L.na..._ y _ er;erm.nect. 
"l.J o cases have been cited by appellees hold-
ing that imn1unity from process vvill be extended 
to a nonresident entering another state s:imply 
for t1:e f>1JTl1ose of attc'rnpting to secure n scttlp_ 
r.1~nt of an action lle:nrl]ng therein, n:nh~r:~ jt i·~ 
e10i1..r fr0~11 th0 P7l(·1ene0 that the nonresirlrr-:t ,,,,rr~s 
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induced or enticed to enter the foreign state 
through fraud or had faith on the part of his 
adversary. It is our conclusion from the evidence 
in this case that appellees have failed to show that 
appellant was guilty of any fraud or bad faith 
in enticing the defendant Reichenbach to enter 
this state on a pretext of trying to effect a settle-
ment of the action pending in Page County. 
"We are therefore constrained to hold that 
the rule of immunity from process claimed by 
appellees cannot be applied under the facts of 
this case." 
COXCL"GSION 
In conclusion Respondent respectfully submits that 
Appellant was not immune from service of process when 
he entered the State of Utah to discuss matters of dif-
ference between him and the Plaintiff; that no public 
policy requires the granting of any immunity to Appel-
lant; and the finding of the court that he 'Yas not im-
mune from service should be affirmed. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
ARTI-ItiR H. XIELSE~~ 
NIELSEX & COXDER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
510 Newhouse Building 
Ra lt Lake City, l~tah 
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